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“’I pay very little attention to legal rules, statutes, constitutional
provisions ... The first thing you do is ask yourself — forget about the
law — what is a sensible resolution of this dispute? ... See if a recent
Supreme Court precedent or some other legal obstacle stood in the way of
ruling in favor of that sensible resolution. ... When you have a Supreme
Court case or something similar, they’re often extremely easy to get
around.” (An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, New York Times,
Sep. 11, 2017).
1 Introduction
Motivated reasoning is the well-documented tendency where individuals actively seek
out confirmatory information. When presented with information, individuals have
an easier time absorbing facts supporting what they want to be true than facts
supporting what they want to be false (Epley and Gilovich 2016 [19]).1 In the lab,
motivation is inferred by the degree to which goal-related concepts are accessible in
memory: The greater the motivation, the more likely individuals are to remember,
notice, or recognize concepts, objects, or persons related to that goal (Tour-Tillery
and Fishbach 2014 [38]).2
In prior studies of motivating reasoning in law, law student subjects are exoge-
nously provided precedents (reasons) (Braman 2006 [11]; Braman & Nelson 2007
[12]). The experiments fix the set of precedents to choose, such that differences in
choices cannot be due to knowledge. In vignettes involving interpreting facts, those
scoring highest in cognitive reflection were the most likely to display ideologically
motivated cognition (Kahan 2013 [27]). But whether these studies on law students
are externally valid to judges or other policymakers is still an open question (Sood
2013 [34]).
The task of this paper is to analyze motivated reasoning among real-world judges,
using as a natural laboratory the U.S. federal courts – a high-stakes common-law
space. Circuit judges can introduce new legal theories,3 shift standards or thresh-
olds,4 and rule on the constitutionality of federal and state statutes. Circuit judges
1The mechanism is said to be implicit emotion regulation – the brain converges on judgments
that minimize negative affective states associated with threat or maximize positive affective states
associated with attainment of motives.
2Typically, studies only measure the final decision, rather than reasoning (Zeigarnik 1927 [40];
Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 2005 [20]), though recent studies have employed vignettes to mea-
sure ex post justification in moral dilemmas (Haidt 2000 [24]). In economics, several recent models
and experiments on motivated reasoning are summarized in Benabou and Tirole (2016).
3E.g., contract duty posits a general obligation to keep promises, vs. a party should be allowed
to breach a contract and pay damages if it’s more economically efficient than performing, also
known as, efficient breach theory, articulated by Richard Posner in a 1985 opinion
4(e.g., shift from reasonable person standard to reasonable woman standard for what constitutes
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provide the final decision on tend of thousands of cases per year, compared to just
a hundred cases or so on the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore Circuit decisions are
the majority of what creates the law in this common law space (and the majority of
what law students are reading). If there is motivated reasoning among these judges,
that could have important legal and policy impacts.
There are a handful of key features of Circuit Courts that make them a desirable
context for this empirical work. First, there is random assignment of cases to judges
(who sit in panels, without juries),5 meaning that judges rule on similar legal issues
on average. Second, there is an adversarial system where the litigants are responsible
for bringing all the reasons (arguments and precedents) to a judge’s attention. This
means that differences in reasoning are not due to differences in knowledge.6 In
addition, the briefs are filed prior to judicial assignment, so strategic information
provision according to judge type is not feasible.
We have data on 300,000 Circuit Court decisions (almost a million judge votes)
for the years 1930-2013. Circuit Court judges are appointed by the U.S. president
(Democrat or Republican) with life tenure. The measures of judicial reasoning are
constructed from the judges’ votes, the texts of the opinions, and the citations be-
tween opinions. These outcome measures are linked to judicial biographical features,
and in particular the party of the judge’s nominating president.
The partisanship measure is based on Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2018,
[23], henceforth GST). It is defined as the accuracy with which we can predict
judge political affiliation based on the content of their decisions. The model uses
penalized estimation of parameters to avoid finite-sample bias. Earlier efforts to
measure polarization in text include Jensen et al (2012) [26], whose non-penalized
measure might over-estimate polarization in early years. Ash et al (2017) [6] use
a similar measure to analyze variation in polarized language in the Senate over
the electoral cycle. Outside of Congress, Jelveh et al. (2017) [25] use the text
of academic articles to predict political donations by economists. An important
difference between our context and these previous papers is that congressmen (and
economists) have discretion over the topics they address, while judges are assigned
topics randomly.
A paralle lliterature has looked at polarization of citizens rather than policymak-
ers. Bertrand et al. (2018) show that partisan affiliations are most associated with
social attitudes (rather than consumption and time use).
Like GST, we first predict judge party using text – prose. We represent judicial
sexual harassment, or waive need to prove emotional harm in court to a jury.)
5This randomness has been used in a growing set of economics papers ([28, 7, 8, 17, 30, 3]).
6That is, we can distinguish are results from mechanical failures of inference due to bounded
rationality or limited attention; in this adversarial setting briefs bring forward all the citeable
reasons.
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prose as N-grams and use those as predictors in the GST model. We find that
average prose partisanship for judges has remained low, unlike Congress. There is
no clear trend over time, either upwards or downwards. By analyzing particular
topics, we found that Democrats are more partisan (more easily predicted) on civil
rights cases, while Republicans are more partisan on First Amendment cases.
A new contribution is to look at polarization of precedent. We use counts over
citations to previous decisions, rather than N-grams, to predict partisan affiliation.
Unlike the case of prose, we find high and significant levels of precedent partisanship
which ebbs and swells over time. We can say that in our context, judges tend to
express ideological differences through citations instead of choice of phrases. These
results complement the previous work by Choi and Gulati (2008) [16] showing that
circuit judges tend to cite judges from the same party, and that of Niblett and Yoon
(2016) [31] showing that circuit judges tend to cite Supreme Court cases authored
by judges from the same party.
Finally, we look at polarization of policy. To do this, we look at dissents along
party lines. We find that vote polarization has increased: Dissents are increasingly
cast by judges sitting in the minority position (with two judges appointed by the
opposing party). Democrats are more likely to issue minority dissents on civil rights
cases, while Republicans tend to issue minority dissents on First Amendment cases.
These findings are related to Sennewald et al. (2015 [?]), who hand-coded a large
sample of district court cases as liberal or conservative and showed that in recent
decades Republican district court judges vote more conservatively, and Democrat
district court judges vote more liberally. The results for judges complement the
large literature on polarization of votes between political parties in Congress (e.g.
McCarty et al 2006 [29]; Andris et al 2015 [1]).
Further evidence of increasing partisan policy interest is increasing prevalence
of politically strategic retirement. Using two centuries of data, we see roughly 13%
of retirements and 36% of resignations following political cycles, and an increase in
retirement partisanship over time. Previous large-scale quantitative studies of the
relationship between politics and judicial exits in the U.S. Courts of Appeals have
not found electoral cycles in judicial turnover rates using a research design conducted
at the yearly level ([39]; [35]; [36]; [41]).
In the appendix we analyze variation across judges in motivated reasoning. Mo-
tivated reasoning is more pronounced for Republican-appointed judges. It grows
with judicial experience (but not age). For circuit judges who later ascend to the
Supreme Court, the motivated-reasoning measure is predictive of future Supreme
Court voting.
This paper adds to the emerging empirical literature in economics using text data
(Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy, 2017, [21]), and the emerging theory literature that is
4
interested in narratives (Benabou et al. 2018 [9]). Our findings are also related to
Berdejó and Chen (2017) [10] and Chen (2017) [14], which show the ideological bias of
judges shifts before Presidential elections through an increase in dissents and partisan
voting, and that this electoral dissent has been growing over time. Ash, Chen, and
Naidu (2017) [5] use phrases from court opinions and journal articles to construct
measures for the influence of law and economics in the federal judiciary. Ash and
Chen (2018[4]) show that document embeddings are not predictive of ideology.
2 Data
The dataset uses the universe of opinions published by U.S. Circuit Courts for the
years 1891 through 2013. Only majority opinions written by a specific author (ex-
cluding opinions labeled per curiam, which are authored by the whole panel without
designating a specific author) are included in the analysis. For judge characteristics,
we link the opinions to the dataset of Berdejó and Chen (2017) [10], and use variables
like circuit, year, gender, education, and years of service.
In addition, the cases are divided into 8 topics that are used in the Songer
database [33]. The eight topics are criminal, civil rights, First Amendment, due
process, labor relations, and economic activity/regulation.7 These Songer topics are
meant to capture the nature of the conflict between the litigants (Songer, 2008 [33]).
2.1 Prose
For each opinion, we use Python scripts to tokenize paragraphs and sentences. Af-
ter removing capitalization and punctuation, we follow a standard approach for text
featurization and represent the cases as frequency distributions over phrases. To con-
struct the vocabulary, we start with the set of observed bigrams (two-word phrases,
as opposed to unigrams, trigrams, etc) in the corpus. This is a standard featurization
choice in information extraction or document classification. In addition, in previous
work we found that most legal concepts (memes) that are shared betewen cases are
encoded in bigrams (Chen et al. 2016 [15]).
To achieve a tractable sample of bigrams, we take the following filtering steps.
First, we exclude phrases that did not appear in at least 10 different opinions in 10
separate years. Second, we apply a parts-of-speech tagger and include only noun
and verb phrases, which tend to be relatively informative and familiar (Denny et al
2015 [18]; Ash 2018 [2]). Finally, we normalize the features using a Porter stemmer
[32] to strip suffixes. This process leaves a total of 32,945 phrases.
7We drop the privacy and miscellaneous categories for lack of cases.
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We then sum the phrase counts to judge-year level, and use these as our obser-
vations for estimation.
2.2 Precedent
For citations, we include citations to prior Circuit Court cases that appeared in at
least 2 distinct cases in 2 separate years. The total number of legal precedents that
satisfy this requirement is 105,948.
2.3 Policy
We have data on all votes case by judges on the panels for each case. Partisan policy
is constructed using data on judge party affiliation and judge dissenting votes. to
look at strategic retirement, we use data from 1800 to 2004 from the Multi-User
Data Base on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges to sum up the number
of retirements or resignations per month.
3 Measuring polarization from text and citations
3.1 Bayesian interpretation of partisanship
Suppose we have a neutral observer who is reading a written opinion from the Circuit
Court. The observer knows little about the writer, and simply reading the opinion
does not provide much information about the writer’s political affiliation. This is true
in theory because judges are asked that they “not be swayed by partisan interests”,8
so opinions are not supposed to convey explicit partisan information. If judges follow
this edict, then a reasonable guess on party affiliation for the naive reader is 0.5 –
i.e., the probabilities of the writer being a Republican or a Democrat are the same.
But this 50/50 guess might not be the best in practice. If the expressed reasoning
of judges is motivated by partisan views, then the choice of language and citations
might be informative. This motivated reasoning would alter the way judges interpret
and evaluate information from briefs and precedents, which would lead to differences
in their expressed arguments. Therefore the Bayesian observer would update their
beliefs toward more informative posteriors.
Following Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2018) [22] (GST), we adopt an intu-
itive approach to demonstrate how political considerations may lead to partisanship
of language and citations in the written opinions of U.S. Circuit Courts. Consider
each court opinion as lists of phrases and citations. Each of these lists can be viewed
as a realization of a probabilistic token generating process. To study the properties of
8http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges
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this process, we want to learn the probability that each token appears in an opinion.
Our theoretical model follows the Naive Bayes approach that these probabilities are
conditional on individual characteristics of the judges. Therefore the token counts
follow a certain distribution characterized by personal traits and total number of
phrases written.
In particular, judges from different parties may use different phrases and cita-
tions in their opinions. Once we know their choice of tokens, we may infer party
membership of a judge better than guessing the prior. Our measure of partisanship,
then, is a function of posterior probabilities of the observer. After we read their
opinions, the posterior probabilities of a judge being a Republican or Democrat is
updated to to qR and qD = 1 − qR, respectively. Partisanship can be understood
as the difference between these posterior beliefs. If prose and precedent are more
predictive of partisan affilitation, then we can say that judicial outputs are more
polarized.
3.2 Theoretical foundation for measuring partisanship
We assume the following model, based on GST (2018) [22]. Let cit be the vector of
phrase counts for judge i in year t, with each member cijt representing the frequency
of a certain phrase j. Let mit =
∑
j cijt be the total number of phrases written
(verbosity), and let l be the list of phrases written. The probability of writing
phrases 1, ..., l a number ci1t, ..., cilt times, with the total number of phrases equal
to mit, is given by a multinomial distribution. Thus cit draws from
cit ∼ MN(mit, qP (i)t (xit)), (1)
where qP (i)t (xit) ∈ [0, 1) is the l-vector of probabilities of writing each phrase at
time t conditional on judge characteristics xit and judge party P (i) ∈ {R,D}. This
probability is unknown to the observer, and it is recovered by the machine learning
algorithm described below. Given cit and mit, our goal is to estimate qP (i)t (xit) in
order to compute the partisanship measure described below.
As in GST, we have a simple discrete choice model that can micro-found the
probabilistic model. The utility function for judge i at year t is
uit =
 δyt + (1− δ)(α
′
t + x′itγt)cit, i ∈ R;
−δyt + (1− δ)(α′t + x′itγt)cit, i ∈ D,
(2)
where yt = ϕ′
∑
i cit is a measure of peer or public opinion, αt is a vector of time
intercepts, R = {i : P (i) = R,mit > 0}, D = {i : P (i) = D,mit > 0} give the sets
of Republican and Democrat judges, and δ is a utility weight that disappears in the
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following transformation.
To simplify the model, assume that every judge chooses his or her phrases to
maximize utility uit with respect to a choice-specific i.i.d. type 1 extreme value
shock. Then we can reduce the above equation into the following:
uijt = α̃jt + x′itγ̃t + ϕ̃j1i∈R, (3)
where ϕ̃ = 2δϕ, γ̃t = γt(1− δ) and α̃t = (1− δ)αt − δϕ. The probability of judge
i writing phrase j at year t is:




where e is Euler’s number.
We would like to measure partisanship by judge and by year. To get partisanship
for a judge we first have to aggregate over phrases. To this end, partisanship πt(x)
is defined as the distance between qRt (x) and qDt (x), the vectors of x-conditioned










t (x)(1− ρt(x)) (5)
where ρt is an l-vector over phrases with entries ρjt(x) = Pr(Party = R|Phrase =





; that is, ρt(x) is the posterior belief that a neutral
observer with a neutral prior assigns to a judge being Republican if he writes phrase j
in year t and has characteristics x. Therefore we have the following elegant Bayesian
interpretation: πt(x) gives the posterior probability that an observer with a neutral
prior would expect to assign to the speaker’s true party (Republican or Democrat)
after reading all tokens, given judge characteristics x.
To compute partisanship in the data at year t, we then have to aggregate over







This partisanship measure is the average of the posterior across all judges and phrases
at year t, and lies between 0.5 and 1. It is the measure we use to analyze partisanship
in the time series below.
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3.3 Model Estimation
Now that we have our matrix of frequencies, we describe the estimation procedure.







[mit exp(α̃jt +x′itγ̃t + ϕ̃j1i∈R)− cijt(α̃jt +x′itγ̃t + ϕ̃j1i∈R) +λj|ϕ̃j|]
}
(6)
where 1i∈R is a vector of indicator variables equaling one for Republican judges, and
λj is a phrase-level penalty term for the political party affiliation of judges.
The characteristics xit include circuit, gender, years of service, and type of un-
dergraduate degree (public or private). These enter as controls in the multinomial
inverse regression. That is to say, we compute the phrase partisanship conditional
on individual characteristics, but the posterior inference on partisanship is made
after controlling for those characteristics. For instance, if all Democrat judges were
women and all Republican judges men, but text was completely random, our poste-
rior update on partisanship using text is still 0.
Taddy (2015) [37] proves that minimizing (6) is equivalent to minimizing the
multinomial logit model, where the the multinomial logit likelihood is approximated
with a Poisson model likelihood. This method allows us to estimate each phrase
separately in parallel, with the phrase count of each individual modeled as
cijt ∼ Pois(exp[log(mit) + uijt]).
This estimation procedure would be infeasible without parallelized computation
across phrases. We impose an L1 penalty on the party membership loadings, which
results in sparsity and shrinkage toward zero. The optimal value of λj is chosen by
minimizing a corrected Bayesian Information Criterion.9
We also include circuit times year fixed effects, which ensures random assignment
of cases. These fixed effects, and the permutation inference, are two methodological
differences from Choi and Gulati (2008) and Niblett and Yoon (2016) [31].
9To implement these methods, we use the R packages distrom and textir, developed by Taddy
(2015) [37]. In the latest version of Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2018) [22], the authors add
a constant penalty on intercepts and other covariates. This feature is not currently available in
the current versions of distrom and textir. We skip this step; but as noted in their article, this is
not necessary for most datasets. Also, instead of penalizing whether a judge is of a certain party
in a certain year, we are just using the penality term for the party affiliation only. We rented an
Amazon Web Service EC2 instance m4.16xlarge with 64 vCPU (virtual CPUs) and 256 GB RAM
(later we transferred to Microsoft Azure virtual machine with similar specifications).
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3.4 Permutation Inference
To analyze polarization over time, we report the main results graphically. To best
illustrate the contrast between the actual partisanship and the permutation result,
we generate a random assignment of party membership of each judge.10
By the definition of partisanship measure, random shuffling of membership should
result in a measurement very close to 0.5, as qRt (x) and qDt (x) are equal when the
other characteristics hold. But if there is small-sample bias, then the permutation
placebo could diverge from .5. Therefore in our figures we show the average parti-
sanship computed from the actual data (solid line) and partisanship computed from
data with shuffled party affiliation (dotted line). Then these lines are close to each
other, that is not evidence of polarization. When the solid line is above the dotted
line, that is evidence of polarization.
4 Partisanship in Prose
This section reports the results on partisanship of prose. The results are reported
as a series of figures. Blue and red dots give individual partisanship measures for
Democrats and Republicans.
10In Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2018) [22], they use the average share of Republican party
during the year which the a particular individual is active for random assignment. In practice, we
found that this is similar to just randomly assigning membership with probability of 0.5, so we also
use 0.5 for random assignment.
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Figure 1: Partisanship in Prose in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013
Partisanship measures over time in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013 for phrases. Black solid lines give the average
partisanship in the true dataset. Dotted lines give average partisanship in the shuffled dataset (random party
affilliations). Red and blue dots show individual observations for Republican and Democrat judges. See text for
further discussion of Specification A/B and other technical details.
Figure 1 illustrates the average and individual partisanship across time for two-
word phrases used by Circuit judges. The magnitude of average partisanship for
phrases of judges is very close to 0.5 for the whole time period. This is evidence
of relatively low partisanship in court opinion text. This is different from the main
result in GST [22], where the language patterns of congressmen exhibited high par-
tisanship.
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Figure 2: Partisanship of phrases by topic
Criminal Law Civil Rights
First Amendment Due Process
Labor Relations Economic Regulation
Partisanship measures over time in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013 for phrases by topic. Black solid lines give the
average partisanship in the true dataset. Dotted lines give average partisanship in the shuffled dataset (random
party affilliations). Red and blue dots show individual observations for Republican and Democrat judges.
Now we examine how partisanship in phrases varies across topics. These results
are reported in Figure 2. Phrase partisanship is consistently low for criminal law, due
process, labor, and economic regulation. For Civil Rights, the language was quite
polarized during the 1930s and 1940s. For First Amendment, there was significant
polarization starting in the 1990s.11
11The First Amendment’s protections have been held to cover flag burning, cross burning, com-
mercial advertising, campaign funding, virtual child pornography, violent video games and DVDs,
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5 Polarization of Precedent
In this section we analyze partisan influnces in the precedents that judges select.
Figure 3: Partisanship in Precedents in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013
Partisanship measures over time in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013 for citations. Black solid lines give the average
partisanship in the true dataset. Dotted lines give average partisanship in the shuffled dataset (random party
affilliations). Red and blue dots show individual observations for Republican and Democrat judges. See text for
further discussion of Specification A/B and other technical details.
Figure 3 illustrates the average and individual partisanship across time for cita-
tions used by Circuit judges. Unlike the text measures, the citations exhibit relatively
high partisanship, at least since the lat 1950s. This measure more comparable to
the congressional language in GST. Unlike choice of phrases, it seems that judges
tend to cite different cases in line with their preferred outcome. These choices are
distinct enough that by looking at their citations one can guess their party affiliation.
However, this does not seem to have increased significantly since 1960.
expressive association, protests at military funerals and abortion clinics, false statements of fact,
nude dancing, limits to disciplinary measures in public schools, government employment actions,
and conditions attached to government benefits.
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Figure 4: Partisanship of precedents by topic
Criminal Law Civil Rights
Due Process
Labor Relations Economic Activity
Partisanship measures over time in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1930-2013 for citations by topic. Black solid lines give the
average partisanship in the true dataset. Dotted lines give average partisanship in the shuffled dataset (random
party affilliations). Red and blue dots show individual observations for Republican and Democrat judges.
We look at precedent polarization across topics in Figure 4. Unlike with text,
the precedents for criminal law are polarized. With civil rights, there are some
small-sample issues in early years but again judges are polarized in recent years. For
due process, labor, and economic activity, again we see polarization in precedents,
especially in recent years.
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6 Partisanship in Policy
In this section we follow up on whether the polarization observed in prose and
precedents are reflected in policy choices, as indicated by voting. We also look at
whether judges are more politically strategic in their retirement decisions.
6.1 Vote Partisanship





Minority * Year 0.000251**
(0.0000280)
N 799180 799180
Case FE X X
Judge FE X X
Cluster Judge Judge
Notes. Effect of being a minority judge (D of DRR or R of RDD) on the likelihood to cast a dissenting vote,
controlling for case and judge fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by judge. Sample is cases with judges from
both political parties. +p < .1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < .01.
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Notes. Left figure displays decade-by-decade effects of being a minority judge (D of DRR or R of RDD) on the
likelihood to cast a dissenting vote, controlling for case and judge fixed effects. Error spikes give 95% confidence
intervals. Right figure displays the share of dissenting votes every year. Vertical line is at 1970.
The section looks at partisanship using judge voting. Table 1 shows that minority
judges are 1 percentage points more likely to dissent and this is growing over time.
Since roughly 2% of votes cast are dissents, the effect size is substantial relative to
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the average. Figure 5 shows that minority dissent is growing more sharply than any
dissent, especially after 1970 when the rate of any dissent has flattened.
Table 2: Vote Partisanship by Topic
Dissent Vote
Criminal Civil Rght 1st Amend Due Process Labor Econ
Minority 0.0105** 0.0196** 0.0244** 0.0105** 0.0142** 0.00398**
(0.00124) (0.00245) (0.00870) (0.00118) (0.00247) (0.000920)
N 171019 46179 3278 179019 37262 232199
Case FE X X X X X X
Judge FE X X X X X X
Cluster Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge
Notes. Effect of being a minority judge (D of DRR or R of RDD) on the likelihood to cast a dissenting vote for
cases of different topics, controlling for case and judge fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by judge. Sample is
cases with judges from both political parties. +p < .1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < .01.
Table 3: Vote Partisanship by Topic and Party
Dissent Vote
Criminal Civil Rght 1st Amend Due Process Labor Econ
Minority 0.00959** 0.0112* 0.0382+ 0.00826** 0.00307 0.00534*
(0.00254) (0.00545) (0.0227) (0.00255) (0.00486) (0.00237)
Minority 0.00285 0.0184+ -0.0267 0.00483 0.0235* -0.00174
* Dem (0.00445) (0.00989) (0.0408) (0.00468) (0.00945) (0.00474)
N 171019 46179 3278 179019 37262 232199
Case FE X X X X X X
Judge FE X X X X X X
Cluster Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge
Notes. Effect of being a minority judge (D of DRR or R of RDD), fully interacted with party, on the likelihood
to cast a dissenting vote for cases of different topics, controlling for case and judge fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by judge. Sample is cases with judges from both political parties. +p < .1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < .01.
Table 2 shows that almost all topics display vote partisanship. Table 3 shows
that Democrats issue more minority dissents in civil rights and labor cases. These
findings echo the greater degree of phrase partisanship among Democrats for civil
rights cases.
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Figure 6: Growth in Vote Partisanship by Topic
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Notes. Figures display decade-by-decade effects of being a minority judge (D of DRR or R of RDD) on the likelihood
to cast a dissenting vote for cases of different topics, controlling for case and judge fixed effects. Error spikes give
95% confidence intervals.
Figure 6 shows the changes in vote polarization by topic over time. There is
some degree of partisanship increase in criminal cases, starting in the 1960s. Civil
rights partisanship appears to have sharply increased in the 1980s and is presently
at a high level relative to partisanship in other legal topics. There is some cycling
in first amendment partisanship, though the standard errors are wide due to the
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smaller sample. Due process partisanship increased in the 1950s, a decade prior to
criminal case partisanship. The figure indicates some partisanship in labor cases,
perhaps cylical as well with high partisanship in the 1920s. There has been a marked
increase in partisanship for economics cases since the 1980s.
Together, these findings tend to corroborate findings in Berdejó and Chen (2017)
[10] and Chen (2017) [14] that there has been a marked increase in the role of partisan
ideology in appellate decisions over the last century.
6.2 Strategic Retirement
In a recent survey, 410 federal judges were asked, “Why do you remain in active
service?” ([13]). Two of the political responses were: “I plan to take senior status
but am waiting for a different appointing authority (i.e., a different political ad-
ministration) to nominate my successor” and “I intend to retire but am waiting for a
different appointing authority (i.e., a different political administration) to nominate
my successor”. Most judges reported a 1 on a Likert scale of 1-7, which is “not at
all important or not applicable.12 The highest-rated responses were, instead, “want
to participate” and “want to retain staffing”/”full caseload”. Less than 1% of U.S.
Federal judges report political motivations for retirement and resignation.
With due respect to the survey answers, we aim to provide empirical evidence
on partisan motivations for judicial retirement. Regressions are of the form:
Exiti = F (t) + Proximity′iβ + εi (7)
where the outcome variable Exiti is the number of judicial retirements or resignations
in month i; the explanatory variable of interest, Proximityi, is a set of quarter-to-
election fixed effects;13 F (t) includes a set of year-specific fixed effects and fixed
effects for each quarter of the year (e.g., January through March, April through
June, etc.);14 finally εi is a mean–zero stochastic error term. In all regressions, the
unit of analysis is the month in order to control for seasonality.15
12To be sure, Likert scales can lead to bias and are not revealed preference measures of true
motivations (Cavaille et al. 2018).
13We compare to quarter 16, i.e., the quarter immediately following an election, which is the
omitted quarter, so the interpretation is akin to a regression discontinuity design.
14The set of year-specific fixed effects is intended to capture shocks or trends affecting judicial
retirement that are common to all judges in a given year, while the quarterly fixed effects control
for seasonal variation in judges’ retirement decisions.
15In all calculations of statistical significance in this section, robust standard errors are used.
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Figure 7 visualizes the results without any covariates. When the party in power
is different, retirements dip in a pronounced manner before presidential elections.
This would be consistent with judges intending to retire but waiting for a different
appointing authority (i.e., a different political administration) to nominate their suc-
cessor, contra what the survey evidence indicates. We include a number of robustnes
checks in the appendix.
To investigate whether political cycles in judicial exits have increased, we divide
the dataset into pre- and post-1975 periods. We compare judicial retirements in the
three quarters immediately following an election with the three quarters immediately
preceding an election (analogizing to a regression discontinuity framework). Formally
we estimate:
Exiti = F (t) + β1Afteri ∗Recenti + β2Afteri + β3Recenti + εi (8)
where F (t) are year and quarter fixed effects; Afteri is an indicator equal to 1 for
the three quarters immediately following a Presidential election; and Recenti is an
indicator variable equal to 1 for the period of time after 1975.
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Table 4: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits Over Time
(1) (2)
After Election -0.0191 -0.0153
(0.0436) (0.0374)
After Election *  Year > 1975 0.497**
(0.223)
After Election * Year > 1900 0.145*
(0.0827)
Year FE Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes
Observations 911 911
R-squared 0.328 0.313
Table 4: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits Over Time
Number of Judicial Retirements
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
The explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating whether it is after an election or not (the 
first three quarters after an election count as "after" while the three quarters before an election count as "before") 
and whether it is recent (before or after 1975; before or after 1900) and the regressions also include year fixed 
effects and seasonly quarter fixed effects.








































































We can see the result in Table 4. The higher rate of voluntary retirements
following an election appears entirely attributable to the post-1975 period. The
20-year moving average correlation between retirement decision and whether it is
after an election (Figure 8) suggests that the electoral cycles we observe in judicial
retirement decisions may be entirely a recent phenomenon. Political cycles may
explain a much larger proportion of judicial exits in recent years, suggesting that
judges have stronger partisan policy motivations than they did in earlier years.
20
The sclerotization of the normal churning of judges to reflect the preferences of
the electorate may raise questions about the non-partisanship of the judiciary. If
judges wait to have their replacements selected by a President from the same party,
and if judges observe others appointed by the opposing party are also waiting, they
may choose to wait as well, creating a positive feedback for the judiciary to become
more polarized over time. Sclerotization of the natural churning of judges may lead
the judiciary to become less reflective of the preferences of the electorate over time.
The fact that judges do not admit to political cycles in exits is consistent with
motivated reasoning.
7 Conclusion
Judges are nominally expected to sit above the partisan fray -- but we find they are
divisive in their rhetoric and decisions. What are the doctrinal sources of ideological
partisanship in the judiciary? One idea is that the language used, or the authori-
ties cited, might be informative about political views. We find that there is small
partisanship across judges in text, but significant partisanship in citations.
This is accompanied by vote partisanship. They tend to dissent along partisan
lines–dissenting only against judges appointed by the opposing party’s president.
In addition, we document retirement partisanship–judges strategically timing their
retirement decisions to be replaced by someone ideologically similar.
Comparing results for phrases and citations, it appears that judges are less po-
larized through their phrases than their citations (legal precedents cited as justifica-
tions). Another open question for future research is the causal relationship between
polarized phrase usage and polarized precedent.
Using all 26 Supreme Court judges (1946-2016) who sat on at least 50 Circuit
cases, we find that judge who moves from the most Democrat to the most Republican
in precedent and phrase usage is 32 percentage points and 23 percentage points,
respectively, more likely to vote conservative. A judge who moves from the lowest
to highest rank in vote polarization is 25 percentage points more likely to vote
conservative. This last result is noteable as either Democrats or Republicans can
cast minority dissents, but this pattern more saliently predicts conservative votes on
the Supreme Court.
We also present a number of findings for future research: does prose concentration
cause citation concentration, and does it lead to social change? One question is
whether motivated reasoning is conscious or unconscious, deliberate or implicit. The
fact that partisanship persists at the time of retirement and is expressed by a judge
in his exit interview would suggest that judges are deliberately engaging in motivated
reasoning. This suggests not all behavioral biases are “Type I” that can be eliminated
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by a nudge.
Asymmetric partisanship suggests that judges from one party are using more
concentrated language whose usage would indicate the party, but non-usage would
not indicate membership in either party. For example, Contract with America was a
smaller vocabulary that the Republican party used in 1994 that marked the increase
in partisanship of congressional speech. The civil rights language concentration by
Democrats occurred in the midst of civil rights changes while First Amendment con-
centration by Republicans occurred in the midst of the originalist movement (“How
Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment”, New York Times, 06/30/2018).
A future question is whether concatenated vocabulary causes social change.
Originalism itself is an example of neologism, coined by Paul Brest in 1980,
when he stated, “By ’originalism’ I mean the familiar approach to constitutional
adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the
intentions of its adopters.” In Google Books, the term “originalism” does not appear
until 1980, and around that time, the time distance between the case and the cases
it cites has grown. Moreover, citations to the Bill of Rights experienced an inflection
in growth around the 1970s, such that currently 30% of cases cite the Bill of Rights.
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A Variation in Precedent Partisanship with Ex-
perience
As an additional appendix result we show that precedent polarization is U-shaped
with experience but declines with age. The growth with experience is more pro-
nounced for Republican judges.
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B Robustness Checks for Strategic Retirement
In order to calculate the share of judicial exits that are politically motivated, we
assume that the benchmark is essentially random retirements or resignations, spread
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evenly over 16 quarters between elections and evenly without regards to the party of
the appointing President. We use as a baseline the fact that on average, 0.14 judges
voluntarily leave the bench each month in my sample; of these, 0.12 are retirements
and 0.02 are resignations.
In each of the three quarters before a Presidential election, the number of retire-
ments for judges when the party in power is different drops by 0.08-0.10 per month
(Table 4 Column 2). This is rather large—summary statistics displayed on the first
row of numbers in Table 4 indicate that when the party in power is different from the
party of the appointing President of the judge, 0.07 judges retire per month. The
magnitudes are invariant to the controls as one might expect from the unconditional
visualization. These effects are also statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level and
much larger in magnitude than the other quarters.16 Estimates from the negative
binomial model also indicate statistically significant reductions in retirements when
the party in power is different (at the 1% or 5% level) for each of the three quarters
preceding a Presidential election.
Finally, to interpret the magnitudes, assuming that we should expect 0.124∗48 =
5.95 judges to retire every 4 years, a back-of-the-envelope comparison yields the
abnormal number of judges not retiring before the election. Regression coefficients
in the three quarters (each containing 3 months) prior to election indicates that
(0.079 + 0.076 + 0.107) ∗ 3 = 0.79 judges are missing, which suggests 13% of judicial
retirements are politically motivated.
16All significance tests are two-tailed with respect to the null hypothesis of no effect. There is
one other quarter that is significant at the 5% level. No statistically significant effects are observed
when the party in power is the same (Column 1). One might expect one effect to be significant at
the 5% level after 20 tests.
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Table 5: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party in Power Same Different Same Different
Mean of dep. var. 0.051 0.073 0.015 0.008
Quartertoelect = 1 0.00741 -0.0793** -0.00832 -0.00430
(0.0269) (0.0365) (0.0109) (0.00413)
Quartertoelect = 2 -0.0130 -0.0762** 0.00861 0.00122
(0.0254) (0.0386) (0.0175) (0.00865)
Quartertoelect = 3 -0.0302 -0.107*** 0.00257 0.0117
(0.0245) (0.0383) (0.0184) (0.00920)
Quartertoelect = 4 0.0270 -0.0101 0.00685 -0.00489
(0.0508) (0.0531) (0.0243) (0.00587)
Quartertoelect = 5 0.00829 -0.00447 0.00834 -0.00265
(0.0539) (0.0614) (0.0274) (0.00979)
Quartertoelect = 6 0.0794 -0.0144 -0.00741 -0.00368
(0.0571) (0.0623) (0.0278) (0.0109)
Quartertoelect = 7 0.0295 -0.0905 -0.0265 -0.00631
(0.0543) (0.0585) (0.0261) (0.00897)
Quartertoelect = 8 0.0344 -0.0399 0.0235 -0.00979
(0.0479) (0.0582) (0.0253) (0.0106)
Quartertoelect = 9 0.0222 -0.0538 0.0315 -0.00755
(0.0489) (0.0614) (0.0249) (0.0135)
Quartertoelect = 10 0.0541 -0.0377 0.0223 0.00450
(0.0558) (0.0659) (0.0252) (0.0167)
Quartertoelect = 11 0.0106 -0.121** 0.0376 0.00851
(0.0481) (0.0612) (0.0258) (0.0173)
Quartertoelect = 12 -0.0377 -0.0699 0.0228* -0.0150
(0.0408) (0.0557) (0.0136) (0.0152)
Quartertoelect = 13 -0.0337 -0.0709 0.0442*** -0.0127
(0.0457) (0.0576) (0.0164) (0.0172)
Quartertoelect = 14 -0.0478 -0.0207 0.0350** -0.00701
(0.0453) (0.0617) (0.0170) (0.0195)
Quartertoelect = 15 -0.0651 -0.0781 0.0290* 0.00355
(0.0416) (0.0595) (0.0160) (0.0206)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2433 2433 2433 2433
R-squared 0.198 0.282 0.098 0.091
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). The outcome
variables are the number judges that retire in a particular month (Columns 1-2) and the number judges that
resign in a particular month (Columns 3-4). 
Table 1: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits
Number of Retirements Number of Resignations
We also see a politically motivated pattern for resignations. As noted above,
the baseline is 0.02 judges resigning per month. In each of the four quarters after a
Presidential election, the number of resignations for judges when the party in power
is the same increases by 0.02-0.04 per month (Column 3). These numbers are again
large relative to the mean—when the party in power is the same as the party of
the appointing President of the judge, 0.015 judges resign per month (and when the
party in power is different from the party of the appointing President of the judge,
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0.008 judges resign per month). These effects are statistically significant at the 1,
5, or 10% level and much larger in magnitude than the other quarters. The effects
are larger in Column 4, which display the regression for the number of resignations
when the party in power is different. Estimates from the negative binomial model
also indicate increases in resignations when the party in power is the same, increases
that are statistically significant at the 1% level for the significant quarters in the
linear model.
To interpret the magnitudes, assuming that we should expect 0.023 ∗ 48 = 1.10
judges to resign every four years, the missing (0.023+0.044+0.035+0.029)∗3 = 0.39
judges calculated by summing the four quarters-to-election coefficients suggests that
36% of judicial resignations follow political cycles.
It is clear these rates for retirements and resignations fluctuate across the politi-
cal cycle. It is important to note that quarter 16, which contains parts of November,
December, January, and part of February is the omitted quarter, which has a co-
efficient of 0. Thus, for instance, in Column 3, the coefficients on quarters 12-15
are estimated to be significant relative to the quarter right after, not relative to the
election date. When we omit quarter 1 instead of quarter 16, so that the omitted
quarter is the one immediately preceding the election, the coefficients on quarters
12-15 are still statistically significant and slightly larger in magnitude.
The patterns are robust to alternative measures of electoral proximity (i.e., linear
quarters-to-next election rather than with quarter-to-election dummies) and drop-
ping one Circuit at a time.17
17The results are also robust to a specification that employs disaggregated data using the number
of retirements per Circuit-month, including Circuit fixed effects, and clustering the standard errors
at the Circuit level.
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Table 6: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits - Robustness Checks
(1) (2)
Drop 1 Circuit at a time
Quarters to Election 0.00563**
(0.00286)
After Election 0.0741*
  (Entire Sample) (0.0425)
After Election 0.0686*
  (Drop Circuit 1) (0.0401)
After Election 0.0784*
  (Drop Circuit 2) (0.0426)
After Election 0.0828*
  (Drop Circuit 3) (0.0427)
After Election 0.0828*
  (Drop Circuit 4) (0.0427)
After Election 0.0414
  (Drop Circuit 5) (0.0375)
After Election 0.0828*
  (Drop Circuit 6) (0.0423)
After Election 0.0752*
  (Drop Circuit 7) (0.0415)
After Election 0.0686*
  (Drop Circuit 8) (0.0415)
After Election 0.0501
  (Drop Circuit 9) (0.0333)
After Election 0.0686*
  (Drop Circuit 10) (0.0400)
After Election 0.0643
  (Drop Circuit 11) (0.0426)
After Election 0.0512
  (Drop Circuit 12) (0.0397)
Number of Retirements
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%).  Voluntary judicial leavings are the number of judges that retire or resign in a 
particular month.  The explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating whether 
it is after an election or not (the first three quarters after an election count as "after" while the 
three quarters before an election count as "before").  Each coefficient represents a separate 
regression.  The regression also includes year fixed effects and seasonly quarter fixed effects (only 
in Column (1)).
Table 2: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits - Robustness Checks
Each coefficient represents a separate regression
These patterns are slightly more pronounced for Republican appointees.
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Table 7: Who Does Political Cycles in Judicial Exits - Party of Appointment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
of Democratic Judges of Republican Judges of Democratic Judges of Republican Judges
Quartertoelect = 1 -0.0367 -0.0456 -0.0141 -0.00219
(0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0105) (0.00772)
Quartertoelect = 2 -0.0390 -0.0578* -0.00943 0.0291*
(0.0319) (0.0350) (0.0127) (0.0155)
Quartertoelect = 3 -0.0599** -0.0683* -0.00556 0.0203
(0.0295) (0.0354) (0.0142) (0.0151)
Quartertoelect = 4 0.00730 0.0217 -0.0000577 0.00739
(0.0427) (0.0573) (0.0177) (0.0170)
Quartertoelect = 5 -0.0359 0.0316 -0.00110 0.00847
(0.0491) (0.0636) (0.0212) (0.0211)
Quartertoelect = 6 -0.00556 0.0652 -0.0160 0.0202
(0.0522) (0.0645) (0.0190) (0.0217)
Quartertoelect = 7 -0.0265 -0.0238 -0.0187 -0.00828
(0.0511) (0.0591) (0.0184) (0.0183)
Quartertoelect = 8 0.0146 -0.0253 -0.000115 0.0246
(0.0483) (0.0575) (0.0183) (0.0182)
Quartertoelect = 9 -0.0351 -0.0349 0.00211 0.0289
(0.0517) (0.0605) (0.0190) (0.0179)
Quartertoelect = 10 0.00174 -0.00791 0.0133 0.0341*
(0.0552) (0.0680) (0.0211) (0.0175)
Quartertoelect = 11 -0.0590 -0.0578 -0.00243 0.0518***
(0.0502) (0.0619) (0.0184) (0.0195)
Quartertoelect = 12 -0.0375 -0.0727 -0.0102 0.0122
(0.0432) (0.0556) (0.0170) (0.0106)
Quartertoelect = 13 -0.0381 -0.0892 0.00554 0.0167
(0.0455) (0.0630) (0.0200) (0.0117)
Quartertoelect = 14 -0.00707 -0.0814 -0.00298 0.0352**
(0.0498) (0.0647) (0.0208) (0.0145)
Quartertoelect = 15 -0.0152 -0.132** -0.00565 0.0330**
(0.0464) (0.0631) (0.0214) (0.0142)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2433 2433 2433 2433
R-squared 0.185 0.226 0.088 0.115
 Table 3: Who Does Political Cycles in Judicial Exit -- Party of Appointment
Number of Judicial Retirements Number of Judicial Resignations
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  Outcome variables are the 
number of judges that retire or resign in a particular month.  The explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating the 
number of quarters remaining before the upcoming presidential election (16 quarters to the election is the omitted dummy variable).  The 
regression also includes year fixed effects and seasonly quarter fixed effects.
Including only judicial exits after 1975 would match the sample relevant to the
[13] survey. Table 8 exhibits substantially larger political cycles in judicial retire-
ments. The baseline is now 0.51 judges retiring per month. Assuming that we should
expect 0.51 ∗ 48 = 24 judges to retire every 4 years, a back-of-the-envelope compar-
ison with the regression coefficients in the three quarters prior to election suggests
that an abnormal number of judges are not retiring before the election—the missing
(0.38+0.48+0.75)∗3 = 4.8 judges who are not retiring would render 20% of judicial
retirements to be politically motivated.
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Table 8: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits After 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party in Power Same Different Same Different
Mean of dep. var. 0.164 0.351 0.017 0.014
Quartertoelect = 1 -0.0315 -0.379* 0.0165 -0.00274
(0.131) (0.207) (0.0210) (0.0171)
Quartertoelect = 2 -0.108 -0.478** 0.00506 0.00589
(0.127) (0.204) (0.0269) (0.0262)
Quartertoelect = 3 -0.203* -0.747*** 0.0295 0.0921*
(0.122) (0.187) (0.0574) (0.0523)
Quartertoelect = 4 0.155 -0.219 0.0153 0.000417
(0.286) (0.273) (0.0199) (0.0141)
Quartertoelect = 5 0.205 -0.300 -0.0385 -0.00251
(0.297) (0.339) (0.0461) (0.0202)
Quartertoelect = 6 0.313 -0.298 -0.0499 0.0537
(0.296) (0.351) (0.0529) (0.0517)
Quartertoelect = 7 0.0698 -0.556* -0.0671 0.00899
(0.281) (0.328) (0.0550) (0.0245)
Quartertoelect = 8 0.341 -0.241 -0.0374 0.000278
(0.247) (0.350) (0.0393) (0.0147)
Quartertoelect = 9 0.296 -0.275 -0.0198 0.0450
(0.245) (0.372) (0.0333) (0.0522)
Quartertoelect = 10 0.547* -0.272 -0.0312 0.00598
(0.311) (0.395) (0.0407) (0.0284)
Quartertoelect = 11 0.209 -0.673* -0.000780 0.0565
(0.230) (0.365) (0.0569) (0.0631)
Quartertoelect = 12 -0.0437 -0.406 -0.0187 0.000139
(0.178) (0.340) (0.0251) (0.00761)
Quartertoelect = 13 -0.136 -0.488 -0.00109 -0.00278
(0.218) (0.347) (0.0243) (0.0135)
Quartertoelect = 14 -0.171 -0.295 0.0351 0.00584
(0.200) (0.365) (0.0602) (0.0239)
Quartertoelect = 15 -0.319* -0.600* 0.0655 0.00871
(0.174) (0.359) (0.0633) (0.0193)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 348 348 348 348
R-squared 0.188 0.248 0.116 0.113
Table 5: Electoral Cycles in Judicial Exits After 1975
Number of Retirements Number of Resignations
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). The outcome
variables are the number judges that retire in a particular month (Columns 1-2) and the number judges that
resign in a particular month (Columns 3-4). 
Table 6 presents the results excluding exits after 1975. Here, only political cycles
in resignations are observed, suggesting that retirements has only recently become
a political tool.
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Table 9: Political Cycles in Judicial Exits Before 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party in Power Same Different Same Different
Mean of dep. var. 0.032 0.027 0.015 0.007
Quartertoelect = 1 0.0157 -0.0223 -0.0129 -0.00458
(0.0212) (0.0186) (0.0125) (0.00370)
Quartertoelect = 2 0.00529 -0.00299 0.00924 0.000529
(0.0197) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.00912)
Quartertoelect = 3 0.00167 0.00967 -0.00272 -0.00312
(0.0184) (0.0226) (0.0193) (0.00521)
Quartertoelect = 4 0.00286 0.0261 0.00518 -0.00577
(0.0245) (0.0348) (0.0285) (0.00634)
Quartertoelect = 5 -0.0279 0.0464 0.0156 -0.00260
(0.0306) (0.0408) (0.0316) (0.0110)
Quartertoelect = 6 0.0392 0.0270 -0.00108 -0.0130
(0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0318) (0.00959)
Quartertoelect = 7 0.0200 -0.0146 -0.0208 -0.00889
(0.0362) (0.0355) (0.0296) (0.00963)
Quartertoelect = 8 -0.0175 -0.00587 0.0336 -0.0115
(0.0321) (0.0307) (0.0291) (0.0121)
Quartertoelect = 9 -0.0249 -0.0163 0.0401 -0.0161
(0.0348) (0.0329) (0.0287) (0.0134)
Quartertoelect = 10 -0.0274 0.00269 0.0312 0.00401
(0.0360) (0.0373) (0.0289) (0.0189)
Quartertoelect = 11 -0.0234 -0.0309 0.0441 0.000615
(0.0368) (0.0323) (0.0288) (0.0174)
Quartertoelect = 12 -0.0377 -0.0145 0.0297* -0.0175
(0.0333) (0.0237) (0.0154) (0.0176)
Quartertoelect = 13 -0.0181 -0.00195 0.0517*** -0.0143
(0.0358) (0.0266) (0.0188) (0.0199)
Quartertoelect = 14 -0.0286 0.0251 0.0351** -0.00921
(0.0377) (0.0315) (0.0173) (0.0224)
Quartertoelect = 15 -0.0244 0.00679 0.0231 0.00265
(0.0349) (0.0264) (0.0157) (0.0238)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2073 2073 2073 2073
R-squared 0.211 0.141 0.102 0.097
Table 6: Electoral Cycles in Judicial Exits Before 1975
Number of Retirements Number of Resignations
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). The outcome
variables are the number judges that retire in a particular month (Columns 1-2) and the number judges that
resign in a particular month (Columns 3-4). 
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